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LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 
C CAikman· 
In 1956, as a recent appointee to the Chair responsible for the teaching of international law, 
I delivered this inaugural lecture in which I defended the study of international law. In the 
lecture I contested the view of American diplomat and commentator, George F Kennan, that his 
countrymen had exaggerated the role that moral and legal principles could usefully play in 
international life. They had, he said, neglected the realistic analysis and pursuit of 
international interests. In response, I endeavoured to show that the international lawyer, along 
with others, had a contribution to make "to the development of a world community which 
projects into the international sphere the ordered peace, free institutions, economic well-being 
and social advancement which are objectives in the municipal sphere." 
I am fortunate to have the opportunity to reflect on what I said over forty years ago and to 
stand by it today. 
The address was given against the background of the cold war. We have a very different 
world today. We now live in a global community at the centre of which is an integrated global 
market facilitated by developments in communications and computer technology. There are 
serious environmental impacts and we are faced with the globalisation of the drug trade, 
terrorism and traffic in nuclear materials. Another consequence of the loosening of the 
straitjacket of the cold war has been the encouragement of nationalist aspirations and the 
incitement of ethnic and religious rivalries and purges of which the crisis in Kosovo is the 
example as I write. 
These developments call for appropriate international action. An effective and peaceful 
global community must have its institutional framework along with rules and regulations 
governing state, corporate and individual behaviour. In other words, there must be a body of 
community or international law. The centre of the institutional framework continues to be the 
United Nations and its associated commissions and agencies. There are, in addition, many 
institutions at both the international and regional level with particular functional 
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responsibilities. Of these the World Trade Organisation has a vital contribution to make to the 
regulation and development of the global market. 
These institutions depend on and are in tum responsible for a vast body of international 
legislation in the form of treaties, conventions, agreements, institutional regulations and 
informal arrangements. These are, of course, supplemented by a host of multilateral and 
bilateral instruments that fall outside institutional activity. 
Perhaps the most significant development in international law since my address has been 
in the international recognition of human rights. The Covenants on Civil and Political Rights 
and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which I referred in 1956, were eventually 
adopted and, despite my doubts, the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights gives a right to individuals to petition the United Nations Human Rights Committee. 
New Zealand is a party to the Protocol and the cases of a number of New Zealand petitioners 
are now before the Committee. Paul Lauren says in his recent book The Evolution of 
International Human Rights: Visions Seen:l 
... a vast array of organizations, declarations, resolutions, judicial rulings, binding covenants and 
conventions, treaty-monitoring bodies, special procedures, technical assistance, NGOs, and thousands of 
experts and servants are now devoted to promoting and protecting international human rights. 
It is now clear that individuals as well as states are subjects of and have rights under 
international law. The implementation of these rights can involve significant intrusions on 
what were once considered the domestic affairs of the states involved. 
I can conclude this introduction, as I began it, by reference to the views of George F Kennan, 
this time as expressed in Around the Cragged Hill, published in 1993.2 He there endeavours 
to set right the "misunderstanding" that he had advocated "a cynical and amoral policy" for 
his country. He shies away from any specific reference to the need for anything in the way of 
legal rules to govern the relations between states, but he does acknowledge that "New 
modalities and institutions for international collaboration will have to be devised" and that the 
United Nations will have an intimate interest in any attempt to find answers to the problems 
involved. Kennan, while expressing some reservations about the international human rights 
movement, goes on to say: 
... I must now do penance by recognizing that the worldwide effects of the human rights movement in 
which both the United Nations and the US government have invested so much of their energies and 
enthusiasm have been in a number of respects beneficial. 
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1998, 297. 
2 W W Norton & Company, New York I London 208, 91 and 72. I am indebted to Sir Kenneth 
Keith for this reference. 
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As a former practitioner in the fields of international and constitutional law, I have 
welcomed the opportunity for more extensive reading and quieter reflection which are to be 
associated with academic life. There is nothing more stimulating than the necessity of 
having to seek to verify the assumptions and re-examine the judgments which one has made 
in the more hurried conditions of active practice. Particularly is this the case when one is 
teaching international law. For it is an inquisitorial and relatively mature student who 
faces this last barrier to the University Degree which will enable him to embark on more 
traditional legal practice. 
The student can perhaps call in aid the views of legal practitioners who question the 
usefulness of the study of international law. He may also share the opinion of the layman, 
who, whether looking back on the events of the present century or considering the headlines 
in his daily newspaper, can see little evidence that there exists in inter-state relations 
anything of the order and justice which he associates with a developed system of law. If the 
student reads more widely, he can find material - the work of distinguished writers on the 
problems of international politics - which, at first sight at least, appears to attach little 
significance to international law .3 
I should like to take as my starting point the views of Mr George F Kennan, who may be 
remembered as a former officer of the United States State Department and the architect of the 
policy of containment. In his book, American Diplomacy 1900-1950, written in 1951, Mr 
Kennan, in setting out his belief that power politics should serve as the basis for United 
States policy, alleges that the failures of that policy during the twentieth century can be 
attributed to what he describes as the "legalistic-moralistic approach to international 
problems".4 His countrymen have exaggerated the role that moral and legal principles can 
usefully play in international life and have accordingly neglected the realistic analysis and 
pursuit of their own national interests. In Mr Kennan's opinion the place of international 
law in international affairs is limited: 
The function of a system of international relationships is not to inhibit ... change by imposing a 
legal strait-jacket upon it, but rather to facilitate it: to ease its transitions, to temper the 
asperities to which it often leads, to isolate and moderate the conflicts to which it gives rise, 
and to see that these conflicts do not assume forms too unsettling for international life in 
general. 
3 Some of these writers are listed by Jenks "The Scope of International Law" (1954) 31 British 
Yearbook of International Law 1, 4. 
4 G F Kennan American Diplomacy 1900-1910 (London, 1953) 95, 98. See also G F Kennan, Realities of 
American Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1954) in which Mr Kennan develops some aspects of his 
argument [Realities of American Foreign Policy]. 
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This, Mr Kennan says, is the task for diplomacy, not law. Law is "too abstract, too 
inflexible". Law cannot "adjust to the demands of the unpredictable and the unexpected". 
So far as the moral aspect of his argument is concerned, Mr Kennan criticises the 
"carrying-over into the affairs of states of the concepts of right and wrong, the assumption 
that state behaviour is a fit subject for moral judgment". National interest and not the 
standard of morality should be the American guide to the conduct of foreign affairs. 
At least one critic of Mr Kennan's thesis has convincingly shown that the shortcomings 
of the "legalistic-moralistic" approach are not substantiated by Mr Kennan's own account 
of American Diplomacy over the past fifty years.5 This I do not intend to pursue. Nor do I 
propose to develop the far-reaching implications for a small country like New Zealand of an 
outlook on international politics which seeks to justify the pursuit by a major power of its 
own self-interest. Need I do more than refer to the disastrous effects indiscriminate disposal 
of United States farm surpluses could have on New Zealand prosperity. 
I have taken Mr Kennan's approach as one typical of the views of many who are 
sceptical of the usefulness of international law. It therefore provides a useful point from 
which to begin an estimate of the part international law has to play in achieving world 
peace and stability. I propose to attempt such an estimate and to conclude with a few 
comments upon Mr Kennan's strictures against the "moralistic" approach. 
I TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law is traditionally defined as the body of legal rules which states feel 
themselves bound to observe in their relations with each other. As so defined, International 
law is to be regarded as exclusively a law between sovereign states, and the perusal of a 
textbook on international law will show that by far the greater part of the rules deal with 
the way in which states carry on their intercourse. They are directed to defining the nature 
of the state, the conditions attaching to its birth and demise (for instance, the law relating to 
recognition and state succession), the extent of state jurisdiction, and the actual procedures 
by which states carry on their relations. The rules relating to appointment and immunities 
of diplomats and the conclusion of international treaties and agreements obviously fall 
within this last category. There will also be some treatment of methods for the settlement of 
international disputes. It will be found that the textbook will devote some attention to the 
rules delimiting the competence of states, but very little to what one Scandinavian writer 
5 Oliver "Thoughts on Two Recent Events Affecting the Function of Law in the International 
Community", in G A Lipsky (ed) Law and Politics in the World Community (University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1953) 197 ff. 
LAW IN 1lffi WORLD COMMUNITY 
calls "norms intended to render state intercourse harmonious with due regard to other 
interests, a social co-ordination for the promotion of common purposes ... .''6 
There are two glosses on what I have just said which should be made at this point: 
The first is that legal philosophers have devoted a great deal of attention to the question 
whether international law is "true" htw or law "properly so-called". They ask such 
questions as: Whence does international law derive its binding character? How can it 
claim to be law if there is no machinery of enforcement? I cannot now embark on a 
discussion of these questions, except to state the view, which has respectable support, that 
the concern about the legal character of international law is concern about a false 
problem? It is no more than an argument about words. Whether or not they conform to the 
tests we are accustomed to use at municipal law, there' are rules governing the relations of 
states which are called law, are regarded as binding and, despite popular belief to the 
contrary, are generally observed. 
My second gloss - and one which is central to ITo/ whole approach - concerns the 
emphasis international law places on procedures. It might be consonant with our ideas of 
law in the municipal sphere that under the heading of settlement of disputes there should 
appear a treatment of judicial settlement, and even of arbitration, but we should not expect a 
discussion, under the sub-heading "political settlement", of mediation, enquiry and 
conciliation. Yet all these methods of peaceful settlement are regarded as fit subjects for the 
student of international law, and their importance can perhaps be assessed in the light of the 
discussions that have taken place on possible procedures for handling the Suez crisis. 
I must emphasise one particular international procedure - the conclusion of treaties. 
include within this term international agreements even if they be of the most informal 
character. These are the nearest equivalent in the international sphere to the part played by 
the legislature under municipal law. Distinctions can be drawn as to the law-making 
characteristics of various types of treaty, but the fact remains that any treaty between 
states, be it between two states or between sixty, creates legal obligations for those states in 
their relations between themselves. Thus the treaty-making process- however informal - is 
the main method by which international law is developed. There is an impressive body of 
treaty law dealing with every imaginable subject. This begins with bilateral agreements 
regulating the trivia of inter-state relations, includes a wide variety of multilateral 
instruments, to which few or many states are parties, and extends to the near-universal 
constitutions of the specialised agencies and to the Charter of the United Nations. 
6 Ross A Textbook of International Law (London, 1947) 57. 
7 Glanville L Williams, "International Law and the Controversy Concerning the Word 'Law"' (1945) 
22 British Yearbook of International Law 146. 
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We have seen that traditional international law consists of rules governing the 
intercourse of sovereign states and delimiting their competence. This means that the 
sovereign state is not called upon to admit any legal restraints on its freedom of action -
whatever the effects may be on other states - other than those contained in the rules of 
international law to which it is subject. That this is the position which Kennan has in mind 
is shown by a passage in his more recent book Realities of American Foreign Policy:8 
If this were really a stable world, if national forms had really set and mellowed everywhere, if 
nations were remaining static, or progressing strictly in parallel in such things as population 
and economic growth and ability to contribute to the life of the world, then I think I would be 
willing to join with the more eager and hopeful of my fellow countrymen in seeking a legal 
framework for the perpetuation of the present status quo, in shifting from the political to the 
legal plane the criteria for determining what is tolerable and what is intolerable in the 
intercourse of nations. But it is only too plain that this is not a wholly stable world, and cannot 
now be, and will not be in our time. 
This is a statement with which the traditional international lawyer would find it 
difficult to disagree; and I myself have no quarrel with it. But I am concerned that he should 
draw the conclusions that the United States should reject the possibilities of dealing with 
the problems of change by legal techniques and procedures and should pursue national 
interest without regard to moral considerations. 
II ANOTHER APPROACH 
The approach of Sir Alfred Zimmem9 is a more satisfying one. He has pointed out that 
traditional international law was developed "as a means for regulating external contacts 
rather than as the expression of the life of a true society ... ". In an earlier passage, in 
discussing the relationship between law and change in the municipal society, he had said: 
... the notion of law and the notion of change, so far from being incompatible, are in fact 
complementary. The law is not a solid construction of dead material, a fixed and permanent 
monument: it is an integral part of a living and developing society created and transmitted by 
men ... And it is because it is felt to have life in it, to be living with and through the society 
which it exists to serve, that it commands men's respect, their obedience, their loyalty and, if 
need be, their self-sacrifice. 
The necessarily close relationship between international law and the society or 
community whose relations it is designed to regulate has led a number of contemporary 
international lawyers to attempt an assessment of the characteristics of the eighty or s<• 
8 Realities of American Foreign Policy above n 2, 37-8. 
9 The League of Nations and the Rule of Law (2 ed, Russell & Russell, London, 1939) 98-99, 96. 
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members of the world community.10 Clearly their main feature is their very diversity. They 
differ in size, geographical features, natural resources, racial composition and stages of 
development, and these differences account for dissimilar economies, cultures and traditions. 
When we recall, as well, that the community is numerically small, we can appreciate the 
difficulties of evolving rules of conduct for its members which meet Zimmem's test by forming 
an integral part of a living and developing community. As Professor Edwin D Dickinson 
has said: 11 
... the architects, builders, and administrators of a useful international law must be prepared 
at all times to support their work on firm understandings of the nations with whose problems 
or relationships they may be concerned. They must be prepared to approach each nation, not 
primarily as a metaphysical concept, but rather as a body compounded of land, people, 
economy, and polity, a way of living and a cultural tradition and a veritable complex of hopes, 
fears and aspirations. These things may not be by-passed safely as matters outside the law. 
They are bone, flesh, and life of the law, largely explaining its frustrations and failures in the 
past and pointing up its prospects for expanded usefulness in the future. 
The problems to be faced may emerge more clearly if I compare the international with the 
municipal community. The analogy between the sovereign and independent member of the 
international community and the citizen of the state immediately suggests itself, but it is more 
helpful to compare the international entity with the various pressure groups which daily 
exercise their influence on the machinery of government within the state.l 2 Just as modem 
states differ in size, resources and population, so pressure groups vary in numbers and the 
influence they can bring to bear. In New Zealand, the Federation of Labour and Federated 
Farmers are perhaps the colossi of the state community, while the lesser pressure groups, 
among whom we must classify the University body, provide some comparison with the less 
powerful members of the world community. The political scientist will tell us that it is the 
balance of these various pressure groups at a particular time which determines the actions 
governments will take. It is the function of good government to keep all these groups in 
equilibrium. The changes which may be necessary to achieve this result are normally made 
by appropriate legislative or administrative action. You and I, as individual citizens, can 
take our personal differences to the courts; and, if we are dissatisfied with the law or the 
policy to which it gives effect, we join with our particular interest group - political, 
10 See Edwin De Witt Dickinson Law and Peace (University of Philadelphia Press, Philadelphia, 1951) 
[Law and Peace] and the references given by F Stone Legal Controls of International Conflict 
(Maitland Publications, Sydney, 1959) 37 ff. 
11 Law and Peace above n 8, 31. 
12 For a development of this theme see Brierly The Outlook for International Law (Oxford, 1944) 
Chapter IV. 
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professional, social, recreational or parochial- and seek a change in the law, whether it be 
the removal of import restrictions, a higher guaranteed price, abolition of capital 
punishment, changed drinking hours - or full University status for Victoria University 
College. We have moved away from the nineteenth century idea of the state as a political 
society, organised to defend itself against external enemies and to maintain peaceable and 
orderly relations within, to the conception of the social service state. The state now 
concerns itself with every field of social and economic activity, and ma>t subjects in which 
we interest ourselves have become potential spheres of government action. It is because the 
government of the day, while enforcing existing law, is prepared to - and must - make 
continual adjustments between our varying interests that civil strife and disorder are 
avoided. The methods of adjustment available to rreet new developments include legislative 
action to change the law. It can thus be ensured that our courts, when called upon to resolve 
legal conflicts, can maintain their reputation for justice and impartiality. 
I have been trying to describe how in the modem state law becomes in Zimmem's words 
"an integral part of a living and developing society created and transmitted by men''. I 
suggest that this description has some lessons in the international sphere. Within the state, 
we have moved from a period when the organisation of the state allowed free rein to the 
social and economic activity of individuals to a period when the state itself takes an intense 
interest in social and economic questions. In the international sphere, we have moved from 
the era, in which international law was concerned to delimit the area within which 
sovereign states could exercise freedom of action, to an era in which it is called upon to 
provide rules of conduct for the highly complex and varied relations of the community of 
nations. As, within the state, the legislature and the judiciary provide the machinery by 
which the law is adjusted or developed according to changing interest-need, so, in the world 
community, machinery must be found which can at the same time adapt and develop the rules 
by which nations will determine their conduct. 
The Suez Canal crisis13 provides an apt illustration of the problem. The 
nationalisation by Egypt of the Canal Company has been justified as an exercise by Egypt of 
her sovereign rights to nationalise a company domiciled in Egypt and to obtain full control 
over a waterway situated in Egyptian territory. It must be conceded that, in broad terms, 
the Egyptian action cannot be attacked as illegal under traditional international law. 
There is, however, probably an obligation to pay compensation to the company's 
shareholders and certainly an obligation to observe the imprecise provisions of the 
Convention of 1888. 
13 This lecture was delivered on 11 September 1956. 
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Egypt and her friends have sought to give legal justification to Egyptian action by resort 
to the doctrine of national sovereignty - a doctrine which has in the past been regarded as 
respectable enough by even the most vocal of the opponents to the seizure. It is accepted that 
any Egyptian interference with transit through the canal would have serious economic 
implications for many maritime states. If this interference did occur, we would have a clear 
demonstration that unyielding adherence to the conception of national sovereignty by one 
state can seriously prejudice other members of the world community. Over the past few 
weeks, the world has, therefore, anxiously watched the attempts which are being made to 
reconcile the independence and prestige of Egypt with the interest of the world community in 
obtaining assurances that the canal will be kept open. President Theodore Roosevelt 
defended arbitrary United States action which preceded the creation of the Republic of 
Panama and the construction of the Panama Canal by laying down the doctrine that "the 
possession of a territory fraught with such peculiar capacities as the isthmus in question 
carries with it obligations to mankind."14 We are again faced with the problem of how to 
assert the claims of the international community to paramountcy over the rights of the 
individual state. 
III POWER IN 1HE WORLD COMMUNIIY 
The diplomatic manoeuvres in the Suez crisis have included indications that the British 
and French might be prepared to use force to gain their ends. This attitude is a reminder, if 
one were needed, that power is the final determinant in the world as in the state community. 
In the internal affairs of a mature and stable state, this power is seldom evident. It is but the 
background against which orderly activities are pursued under the beneficent guidance of a 
relatively small police force. There are small and homogeneous countries, like the United 
Kingdom and the Scandanavian states, with a tradition of respect for institutional 
government; and there are large heterogeneous countries, like the United States and Canada, 
which have been able to manifest their overall unity of purpose by fitting their diversities 
into the rather rigid framework of a federal system. It is these federal systems which have in 
the main provided the models for the proponents of world government; but these visionaries 
do not appear to appreciate that there is not within the world community the geographic 
unity, the degree of social and economic integration or the singleness of purpose, which 
characterise the most complex, or even the least stable, of the federal states. 
We have, however, seen in this century two attempts to mobilise the power of the nations 
behind a world order of sovereign and equal states. The League of Nations received such 
irresolute support- from our own country as from others - that prospects of success were, 
from the beginning, remote. The United Nations, a more ambitious attempt, sought to draw 
14 Quoted in J Fischer Williams International Change and International Peace (Oxford University Press, 
London, 1932) 20. 
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on the lessons of the previous twenty-five years; but, so far as its collective security 
machinery is concerned, the procedures laid down in the Charter are even more rigid and 
difficult to work than those of its predecessor. Based on the pious assumption that the two 
major power blocs would maintain their enforced war-time unity, the structure of the 
Security Council is ill-adapted to deal with problems which are the direct consequence of 
conflicts of interest between these two blocs. Nevertheless, to allocate blame, either to the 
procedural device of the veto, or to the machinations of either the United States or the Soviet 
Union, is to ignore the strains and pressures which exist within the world community. Any 
realistic appreciation of the present world situation must recognise that there is no 
possibility of achieving within any measurable period - unless it be by world conquest -
that concentration of power which we associate with the regime of the national state. There 
is even less chance now than there was in the time of the League of Nations. The Soviet 
Union and the United States now dominate the world scene and international tensions in a 
large part reflect their mutual fears and ideological rivalries. 
The pattern of these fears and rivalries has changed markedly since the Soviet Union 
acquired the ability to wage nuclear war. Each of the two major power groups must know 
that nuclear attack will lead to immediate retaliation, with its resulting havoc for all. This 
nuclear stalemate has given the Soviet Union a greater sense of security, and has already led 
it to take the initiative in reducing the sizes of conventional armed forces. The Communists 
have, therefore, been able to redirect some of their economic resources to the provision of 
help and assistance to the uncommitted areas of the world. These include that great arc of 
countries from North Africa and the Middle East to South and South-East Asia, moo of 
which are revelling in their escape - or imminent escape - from political dependence on the 
Western world. We cannot be led into the belief that Soviet intentions are any the more 
amiable now that they are expressed in economic and social terms; but the West is faced 
with the opportunity- and the necessity - not only of increasing its own economic and social 
help to under-developed countries, but also of showing by example that its moral 
imperatives and conception of justice under law have more to offer to peoples emerging from 
dependence than has totalitarian Communism. 
This situation presents a challenge to the Western world which cannot be rr6 by the 
resources of any one discipline; but I should like to attempt a statement of some of the issues 
upon which international law can profitably concentrate, if it is to have the inner strength 
and adaptability which are required to meet the needs of a world community in transition. 
IV THE UNITED NATIONS 
It does I think follow from what I have said that at the higher political level- or, to use a 
familiar expression, at the level of the vital interests of states - we cannot at this stage 
expect very much in the way of formal rules of conduct binding upon states. Here it is that 
diversity of interest militates most against the development of general rules of conduct, and 
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that emphasis must be placed on procedures for adjustment and compromise. The traditional 
methods of diplomacy - whether at the level of Heads of State and Foreign Ministers or of 
the working diplomat - will continue to provide opportunities for negotiation and the 
building up of confidence. Mediation, enquiry and conciliation have already been noticed; 
and let us not be too ready to overlook the United Nations, which - now that many of the 
outstanding applicants for membership have been admitted - has a near claim to 
universality. With the exception of Korea, the world organisation has achieved little in 
matters affecting direct East-West relations; but it has shown that it is better equipped to 
handle problems in the uncommitted areas of the world. Some success can be claimed in 
respect of aspects of the Palestine issue and in the cases of Kashmir and Indonesia; and the 
General Assembly has provided a forum in which the nationally conscious and under-
developed countries of Asia and the Middle East have been able to press claims for 
independence. 
It is in dealing with the painful problems - whether they be of politics, economics, 
strategy or merely of prestige - associated with emerging nationalism that traditional 
international law is particularly ill-equipped. Emphasis by colonial powers on their own 
sovereign integrity, and failure to develop procedures for what has been known as "peaceful 
change", command little sympathy from the inhabitants of those areas which, whatever their 
nominal status, have fallen under the broad canopy of "colonial territories". As I have just 
suggested, the United Nations has not been without its achievements in this field, and, now 
that the Arab-Asian group has obtained an accession of strength from amongst the recently-
admitted members of the United Nations, we can expect that still more attention will be 
devoted to such questions as the self-determination of peoples, fundamental rights and 
freedoms, and the social and economic welfare of under-developed countries. This means 
that the United Nations will be dealing with issues which concern, directly or indirectly, 
most members of the world community, and which also affect the daily lives of millions of 
people. The organisation can make a real contribution to the problems involved if, on the 
one hand, the so-called colonial powers and their supporters are prepared to use the 
machinery provided to follow flexible and realistic policies; and if, on the other hand, the 
anti-colonial group of powers temper stridency with restraint. There would then be created 
an atmosphere in which the United Nations could perform the dual function of distilling a 
moral approach acceptable on all sides and of providing machinery for evolving generally 
acceptable rules of conduct. And, let it be said, only in these conditions can our nurll 
vaunted freedom and respect for order under law continue to be an influence outside the 
more mature countries of the West. 
There are certain conditions which must in my view be fulfilled if the United Nations is 
to play the part I have suggested in providing machinery for resolving conflicts of interest. 
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In the first place, the organisation must be a universal one. At the 1955 session of the 
General Assembly sixteen new members were admitted, but Japan,15 Outer Mongolia and 
the divided countries of Vietnam and Korea are still outstanding applicants, and East and 
West Germany are unrepresented. A means must also be found of introducing a spokesman 
for Communist China, whether or not this involves exclusion of Nationalist China. 
In the second place, it must become clear that the organisation is not regarded as an 
instrument for giving effect to purely Western policies. Some lowering of direct East-West 
tensions, and increased membership, provide hope that voting alignments will be less rigid, 
and that more opportunity will be provided for adjustment and reconciliation of points of 
view. 
In the third place, a liberal and flexible, rather than a formal and literal, approach must 
continue to be adopted in the interpretation of the Charter. It is to the credit of both the 
Security Council and the General Assembly that they have not hesitated to adapt their 
procedures to the circumstances of cases and to adopt courses of action which, if not rigidly 
in accord with Charter provisions, have been calculated to serve the overall objective of 
maintaining peace and security.1 6 This is the kind of development with which we are 
familiar in our own constitutional experience where conventions have played a big part in 
keeping the law in step with changing conditions. 
There are other ways in which the adaptability and inherent vitality of the United 
Nations can be displayed. Thus, in his 1955 Report on the work of the organisation, the 
Secretary-General, Mr Hammarskjold, made it clear that he recognised the limitations of 
conference by public debate. He called for more informal diplomatic contacts within the 
United Nations, whether directly between representatives of Member Governments or in 
contacts between the Secretary-General and Member Governments, and concluded "It is ny 
hope that solid progress can be made in the coming years in developing new forms of contact, 
new methods of deliberation and new techniques of reconciliation".l 7 
Mr Hammarskjold has given other evidence- including his negotiations in Peking on the 
release of American fliers, and his recent activities in Israeli-Arab disputes - that he has a 
broad approach to the functions of his office. And many -believe that the prestige that now 
attaches to his position would enable him to play an important role in the Suez crisis, either 
as a conciliator or as chairman of any international body that may be established. 
15 Japan was admitted to the United Nations on 18 December 1956. 
16 This development is brought out in L M Goodrich and A P Simons The United Nations and the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Washington IX, 1955). 
17 Annual Report of the Secretary-Genera/ on the Work of the Organisation 1 July 1954-15 June 1955 
General Assembly Official Records, lOth 5ession, Supplement No 1, A/2911, (New York, 1955) xii. 
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V INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY IN THE FUNCTIONAL FIELD 
So far, I have been dealing more particularly with the work of the United Nations in the 
political field - with the contribution it can make in matters of high policy. But the United 
Nations and its related agencies have been performing mud\ effective work in what I shall 
describe as the functional field - in the social, cultural, economic and humanitarian 
problems which daily affect the lives of us all. The statesmen who wrote the Charter gave 
the organisation a wide competence. They looked across the state frontier to what the 
Charter described as "the Peoples of the United Nations", and recognised that the economic 
and social development of these peoples and respect for their rights and freedoms "without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"18 was the only basis on which a peaceful 
and ordered world community could be built. 
The achievement of these aims is a declared function of the United Nations, and it would 
take a long time to give even the most summary account of the comprehensive work of the 
organisation and its associated agencies. Much of the work is difficult and undramatic, but 
it can provide the foundations of a living and developing world community. There is the 
Economic and Social Council, and its Commissions on such subjects as transport and 
communications, statistics, human rights, narcotic drugs and the status of women. The 
Trusteeship Council and the Committee on Non-self-governing Territories concern 
themselves with the welfare of trust and dependent peoples, while the programme of 
technical assistance to underdeveloped areas has become one of the greatest importance in 
the field of international co-operation. 
The Specialised Agencies include the Universal Postal Union, the International 
Telecommunication Union, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation and the Internatibnal Monetary Fund, as well as other world organisations 
whose activities have an impact on practically every sphere of human activity. The 
techniques with which they work are infinitely varied. The technical conference, the 
visiting expert, information material, the training of students, financial aid, the laying down 
of standards, discussion and recommendation, or the conclusion of agreements and 
conventions - each is used as the circumstances demand. Moreover, the agencies provide 
each state with the opportunity of contributing in the fields in which it is best equipped. 
New Zealand, although a small country, obviously has more than ma;t to offer to the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation; also her particular experience has enabled her to play an 
active part in the International Labour and World Health Organisations. 
Civil Aviation provides examples of a number of techniques. The Internatio":al Civil 
Aviation Organisation is authorised to lay down international standards and recommended 
18 Charter of the United Nations, Article 1. 
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practices. These include uniform air regulations, without which international flying would 
come to a standstill. In addition, a number of multilateral conventions, on such subjects as 
the liability for damage caused on board aircraft to passengers and goods and the liability 
for damage caused by aircraft to third parties on the surface, have been negotiated. Then 
there is the vast network of bilateral agreements covering the operation of the many 
international air-routes. New Zealand is a party to a number of multilateral conventions 
and to bilateral arrangements with the United States, Canada and France. 
VI ACT1VI1Y AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
The very size and diversity of the world community within which these international 
agencies and bodies operate has led, too, to a wide extension of activity at the regional level. 
The Charter of the United Nations, with the example of the inter-American system before it, 
did not preclude the establishment of "regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with 
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are 
appropriate for regional action ... ".19 However, regional security pacts - like NATO, 
ANZUS, SEATO and the Warsaw Pact and Uniform Arms Accord concluded by the 
European Communist States in May 195520 - are hardly consistent with the Charter aim 
that the United Nations should retain the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. They are, indeed, a recognition that the collective security 
machinery provided in the Charter has not proved effective. 
The regional concept, as applied to functional fields, is particularly significant from the 
point of view of the development of the world community. The United Nations has itself 
established the Economic Commission for Europe and equivalent Commissions for Asia and 
the Far East, and for Latin America. Most of the Specialised Agencies have found it 
profitable to establish subordinate bodies with responsibilities in particular geographic 
areas. 
There are, besides, instances of autonomous regional bodies. In Europe there are 
political groupings like the Council of Europe and functional groupings like the European 
Coal and Steel Community. The Colombo Plan is Commonwealth-inspired, and provides 
technical assistance and economic aid in South and South-East Asia. The South Pacific 
Commission, with which New Zealand is also associated, is concerned with the welfare of 
peoples in the South Pacific. During a recent visit to some of the Islands of the South Pacific 
I had the opportunity of meeting some of the representatives, indigenous and European, who 
had been attending the third South Pacific Conference, held under the auspices of the South 
Pacific Commission It was gratifying to learn how active and effective had been the part 
19 Article 52(1). 
20 For text of the Warsaw Pact see External Affairs Review Vol V, No 5 May 1955, 20. 
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played by the indigenous peoples of the area in the work of the Conference. I saw, too, that 
Commission experts who are working in the territories at the invitation of the Governments 
concerned are proving of real assistance to the local administrations. 
The range of this functional and regional activity is so comprehensive and pervasive 
that it cannot but have some impact on the daily lives of many millions of the world's 
inhabitants. And this is as it should be. Although the international machinery and 
procedures involved are sponsored by governments, they are designed to further the welfare 
of individuals, and I have already pointed out that the United Nations Charter has 
emphasised the necessarily close connection between world order and the economic and 
social advancement of all peoples. The Charter also requires the United Nations to promote 
and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all. Already, 
many of the most contentious United Nations issues have concerned some aspect of this wide 
mandate, whether it be apartheid in South Africa, slave labour in the Soviet Union or self-
determination for Morocco and Algeria. In 1948 the Assembly was able to obtain near 
unanimity on a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which, although it does not afford 
legally enforceable rights, does provide in the terms of its preamble "a mmmon standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations". The Commission on Human Rights and the 
General Assembly have since been engaged in the drafting of two covenants, one on civil and 
political rights, the other on economic and social rights. The intention is that member states 
on accepting the covenants should be legally bound to give effect to the rights as enumerated. 
It would be a mistake to believe that the difficulties associated with the drafting of these 
covenants will be quickly disposed of, involving as they do significant inroads on the 
concept of state sovereignty. Thus, if the covenants are to be adopted, there is no prospect 
that, initially, they will contain procedures which will enable the individual to seek redress 
from an international authority. This United Nations activity and the entry into force of a 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are, 
however, an earnest that the international lawyer recognises that individuals are indeed 
the ultimate members of the world community and now regards the international guarantee 
of the rights of the individual as one of his goals. 
It may be felt that I have placed too mum emphasis on the proliferation of international 
organisations which is a feature of the past ten years. I have done so because I believe that 
only by activity at the functional and regional levels and by concern for the protection of 
the individual can we build a world· community which has the unity and homogeneity 
necessary to sustain a developed system of law. 
VII ARBITRATION AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT 
I must next say something about the part played in international law by arbitration and 
judicial settlement. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the development of 
arbitration as a method of settling state differences; and in 1920 the Statute of the Permanent 
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Court of International Justice was adopted by the League of Nations. The Permanent Court 
was responsible for the development of an impressive body of international jurisprudence, 
and when in 1945 the International Court of Justice was established as a principal organ of 
the United Nations this new court to a large extent succeeded to the jurisprudence and 
traditions of its predecessor. 
In estimating the contribution that judicial settlement can make in the development of the 
rule of law in the international community, account must be taken of the fact that 
submissions to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice are voluntary, and that 
there is no world legislature which can ensure that the development of the law keeps pace 
with needs in the community which it serves. In these circumstances, a distinction has been 
drawn between legal or justiciable and political or non-justiciable disputes. A justiciable 
dispute is one which the parties recognise as being a conflict as to "rights" under 
international law and as such susceptible to arbitral or judicial settlement. On the other 
hand, in a non-justiciable dispute, one, or both, of the parties is claiming that it is just and 
equitable that their mutual rights and obligations should be revised. The essence of a non-
justiciable dispute is that a change in existing rights is sought. In other words, it is the kind 
of situation which in the municipal sphere is dealt with by legislative action or by the 
invocation of sanctions against someone who has not succeeded in having the law altered to 
suit him. 
I believe, therefore, that, having regard to the absence of authoritative procedures for 
peaceful change, judicial settlement of international disputes will not in the l:mrnediate future 
play the part in the development of the law which some might expect. It is significant that 
during the first ten years of its existence the new International Court of Justice has had less 
business than the old Permanent Court during the corresponding period. Nevertheless, I do 
not wish to understate the achievements of the new Court. In many of its decisions it has 
been faced with a choice either of upholding national sovereignty by a rigid or literal 
interpretation of international obligations, or of extending international accountability by 
a more flexible and dynamic approach. The Court has frequently made the second choice, 
and by so doing has extended the frontiers of international law. There has been criticism 
that the Court has, indeed, gone too far in making new law for the parties, but there are 
cases, particularly those involving advice to the United Nations on its functions and 
powers, in which the Court has spoken with constructive authority. I can instance the 
Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations.21 
This opinion arose out of the murder of Count Bernadotte in Jerusalem, and the Court 
advised that the United Nations was itself entitled to bring an international claim in respect 
of an injury suffered by one of its agents. In the Advisory Opinion on the Effect of Awards of 
21 ICJ Reports 1949, 174. 
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Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribuna/,22 the Court, in the face 
of United States argument to the contrary, advised that the General Assembly was bound to 
give effect to awards of compensation made by the independent Administrative Tribunal to 
certain United States nationals who had been wrongfully dismissed. This opinion is a 
landmark in the establishment of the international and independent character of the United 
Nations Secretariat. 
VIII MORAL PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
I have tried to show that international law now provides us with basic commitments 
and procedures which we can use in making the slow and painful transition from a world of 
states, jealous of their national sovereignty, to a community of nations which can sustain a 
developed system of law. I can go some way towards Kennan's views by agreeing that these 
commitments and procedures have a limited effectiveness in matters concerning the vital 
interests of states; but not so far as to accept his apparent rejection of the part they can play 
in the gradual emergence of a world community which has the institutional framework 
equipped to handle the problems of change with which he is so much concerned. 
Nor can I accept his rejection of "morality as a general criterion for the determination of 
the behaviour of states and above all as a criterion for measuring and comparing the 
behaviour of different states".23 Mr Kennan advocates, in the place of morality, the pursuit 
of national interest and return to the "forgotten" art of diplomacy. Now, clearly no 
government can fail to have regard to national interest. Its pursuit is itself a function of 
government. But what are the criteria for identifying that interest? Should it serve certain 
values or should we reconcile ourselves to the fact that the issue between the free world and 
the communist world is simply one of naked power, in which ideas like morality and justice 
have no part? 
It seems incontestable that to deny the application of moral principles in international 
affairs is to reject one of the foundations of human society. In the present context we must 
also realise that, in the struggle for men's minds which is going on in the uncommitted areas 
of the world, the influence of the West will ultimately depend not on the deterrent of the 
nuclear bomb, not even on generous economic aid, but on the extent to which we can 
demonstrate that the moral and legal principles on which our free institutions are based 
have a universal validity. A great American lawyer and statesman, Elihu Root, has said:24 
22 ICJ Reports 1954, 4. 
23 Realities of American Foreign Policy above n 2, 49. 
24 Quoted by McDougal "Law and Power" (1952) 46 Am J of Int'l L 102, n 54. 
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... in the most important affairs of nations ... there is an indefinite and almost mysterious 
influence exercised by the general opinion of the world regarding the nation's character and 
conduct. The greatest and strongest governments recognise this influence and act with 
reference to it. .. 
... It is difficult to say just why such opinion is of importance, because it is always difficult to 
analyse the action of moral forces; but it remains true and is universally recognised that the 
nation which has with it the moral force of the world's approval is strong, and the nation 
which rests under the world's condemnation is weak, however great its material power. 
In my view, this statement has some relevance to the Suez crisis. I believe that the United 
Kingdom and France, were they to forsake the course of negotiation and compromise, 
including resort to United Nations procedures, and to seek to establish the international 
status of the canal by force of arms, would lose more in terms of prestige and moral stature 
than could conceivably be gained by force. At one stroke, the fund of goodwill, which 
Britain gained by withdrawal from India and imaginative handling of other issues in which 
her imperial interest came into conflict with nationalist aspirations, would be dissipated. 
Goodwill would be lost in Asia as well as in the Middle East, and the withdrawal of India 
and Ceylon could mean the end of the multi-racial Commonwealth, that unique free 
association of nations, the very existence of which recognises the illusion of complete 
national independence and the realities of interdependence. 
I should like to conclude by emphasising that, today, the international lawyer must be 
concerned, along with the economist, the social scientist, the technician, the teacher, the 
international civil servant and the diplomat, to make a contribution to the development of a 
world community which projects into the international sphere the ordered peace, free 
institutions, economic wellbeing and social advancement which are objectives in the 
municipal sphere. At the higher level, this involves a c::omrnitment to change by peaceful 
means and the development of procedures for the compromise and adjustment of divergent 
interests and policies. At all levels, and, immediately, at the bottom rather than the top, it 
involves either the arduous and undraqmatic extension of the areas of community interest or 
the acceptance and reconciliation of divergent national characteristics and ideas. The 
United Nations, the Specialised Agencies and the regional organisations provide us with the 
basic framework. With them we can build a world community which has as its values, 
freedom, peace and plenty. 
